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Abstract. We introduce Normative Temporal Logic (ntl), a logic for
reasoning about normative systems. ntl is a generalisation of the well-
known branching-time temporal logic ctl, in which the path quantifiers
A (“on all paths. . . ”) and E (“on some path. . . ”) are replaced by the
indexed deontic operators Oη and Pη, where for example Oηϕ means
“ϕ is obligatory in the context of normative system η”. After defining
the logic, we give a sound and complete axiomatisation, and discuss the
logic’s relationship to standard deontic logics. We present a symbolic
representation language for models and normative systems, and identify
four different model checking problems, corresponding to whether or not
a model is represented symbolically or explicitly, and whether or not we
are given an interpretation for the normative systems named in formulae
to be checked. We show that the complexity of model checking varies
from p-complete up to exptime-hard for these variations.
1 Introduction
Normative systems, or social laws, have been widely promoted as an approach
to coordinating multi-agent systems [Shoham and Tennenholtz, 1996]. Crudely,
a normative system defines a set of constraints on the behaviour of agents, corre-
sponding to obligations, which may or may not be observed by agents. A number
of formalisms have been proposed for reasoning about normative behaviour in
multi-agent systems, typically based on deontic logic [Meyer and Wieringa, 1993].
However the computational properties of such formalisms – in particular, their
use in the practical design and synthesis of normative systems and the com-
plexity of reasoning with them – has received little attention. In this paper, we
rectify this omission. We present Normative Temporal Logic (ntl), a logic for
reasoning about normative systems, which is closely related to the well-known
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and widely-used branching time logic ctl [Emerson, 1990]. In ntl, the universal
and existential path quantifiers of ctl are replaced by indexed deontic operators
Oη and Pη, where Oηϕ means that “ϕ is obligatory in the context of the norma-
tive system η”, and Pηϕ means “ϕ is permissible in the context of the normative
system η”. Here, ϕ is a temporal logic expression over the usual ctl temporal
operators g,♦, , and U (every temporal operator must be preceded by a
deontic operator, cf. ctl syntax), and η denotes a normative system. In ntl,
obligations and permissions are thus, first, contextualised to a normative system
η and, second, have a temporal dimension. It has been argued that the latter
can help avoid some of the paradoxes of classical deontic logic. ntl generalises
ctl because by letting η∅ denote the empty normative system, the universal
path quantifier A can be interpreted as Oη∅ ; much of the technical machinery
developed for reasoning with ctl can thus be adapted for ntl [Emerson, 1990;
Clarke et al., 2000]. ntl is in fact a descendent of the Normative atl (natl)
logic introduced in [Wooldridge and van der Hoek, 2005]: however, ntl is much
simpler (and we believe more intuitive) than natl, and we are able to present
many more technical results for the logic: we first give a sound and complete ax-
iomatisation, and then discuss the logic’s relationship to standard deontic logics.
We introduce a symbolic representation language for normative systems, and in-
vestigate the complexity of model checking for ntl, showing that it varies from
p-complete in the simplest case up to exptime-hard in the worst. We present
an example to illustrate the approach, and present some brief conclusions.
2 Normative Temporal Logic
Kripke Structures: Let Φ = {p, q, . . .} be a finite set of atomic propositional
variables. A Kripke structure (over Φ) is a quad K = 〈S ,S 0,R,V 〉, where: S is
a finite, non-empty set of states, with S 0 ⊆ S (S 0 6= ∅) being the initial states ;
R ⊆ S × S is a total binary relation on S , which we refer to as the transition
relation1; and V : S → 2Φ labels each state with the set of propositional variables
true in that state. A path over R is an infinite sequence of states π = s0, s1, . . .
which must satisfy the property that ∀u ∈ N: (su , su+1) ∈ R. If u ∈ N, then
we denote by π[u] the component indexed by u in π (thus π[0] denotes the first
element, π[1] the second, and so on). A path π such that π[0] = s is an s-path.
Normative Systems: In this paper, a normative system is a set of constraints on
the behaviour of agents in a system. More precisely, a normative system defines,
for every possible system transition, whether or not that transition is considered
to be legal or not. Different normative systems may differ on whether or not
a transition is legal. Formally, a normative system η (w.r.t. a Kripke structure
K = 〈S ,S 0,R,V 〉) is simply a subset of R, such that R \ η is a total relation.
The requirement that R \ η is total is a reasonableness constraint: it prevents
normative systems which lead to states with no successor. Let N (R) = {η | (η ⊆
R) & (R \ η is total)} be the set of normative systems over R. The intended
1 A relation R ⊆ S × S is total iff ∀s ∃s ′ : (s, s ′) ∈ R.
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interpretation of a normative system η is that (s , s ′) ∈ η means transition (s , s ′)
is forbidden in the context of η; hence R \ η denotes the legal transitions of
η. Since it is assumed η is reasonable, we are guaranteed that a legal outward
transition exists for every state. If π is a path over R and η is a normative system
over R, then π is η-conformant if ∀u ∈ N, (π[u], π[u + 1]) 6∈ η. Let Cη(s) be the
set of η-conformant s-paths (w.r.t. some R).
Since normative systems are just sets (of disallowed transitions), we can com-
pare them, to determine, for example, whether one is more liberal (less restric-
tive) than another: if η ⊂ η′, then η places fewer constraints on a system than
η′, hence η is more liberal. Notice that, assuming an explicit representation of
normative systems, (i.e., representing a normative system η directly as a subset
of R), checking such properties can be done in polynomial time. We can also op-
erate on them with the standard set theoretic operations of union, intersection,
etc. Taking the union of two normative systems η1 and η2 may yield (depending
on whether R \ (η1 ∪ η2) is total) a normative system that is more restrictive
(less liberal) than either of its parent systems, while taking the intersection of
two normative systems yields a normative system which is less restrictive (more
liberal). Care must be taken when operating on normative systems in this way
to ensure the resulting system is reasonable.
Syntax of NTL: The language of ntl is a generalisation of ctl: the only is-
sue that may cause confusion is that, within this language, we refer explicitly
to normative systems, which are semantic objects. We will therefore assume a
stock of syntactic elements Ση which will denote normative systems. To avoid a
proliferation of notation, we will use the symbol η both as a syntactic element
for normative systems in the language, and the same symbol to denote the cor-
responding semantic object. An interpretation for symbols Ση with respect to
a transition relation R is a function I : Ση → N (R). When R is a transition
relation of Kripke structure K we say that I is an interpretation over K. We
will assume that the symbol η∅ always denotes the emptyset normative system,
i.e., the normative system which forbids no transitions. Note that this normative
system will be reasonable for any Kripke structure. Thus, we require that for all
I : I (η∅) = ∅. The syntax of ntl is defined by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= ⊤ | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | Pη fϕ | Pη(ϕU ϕ) | Oη fϕ | Oη(ϕU ϕ)
where p ∈ Φ and η ∈ Ση. Sometimes we call α occurring in an expression Oηα
or Pηα a temporal formula (although such an α is not a well-formed formula).
Semantic Rules: The semantics of ntl are given with respect to the satisfaction
relation “|=”. K, s |=I ϕ holds when K is a Kripke structure, s is a state in K, I
an interpretation over K, and ϕ a formulae of the language, as follows:
K, s |=I ⊤;
K, s |=I p iff p ∈ V (s) (where p ∈ Φ);
K, s |=I ¬ϕ iff not K, s |=I ϕ;
K, s |=I ϕ ∨ ψ iff K, s |=I ϕ or K, s |=I ψ;
K, s |=I Oη fϕ iff ∀π ∈ CI (η)(s) : K, π[1] |=I ϕ;
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K, s |=I Pη fϕ iff ∃π ∈ CI (η)(s) : K, π[1] |=I ϕ;
K, s |=I Oη(ϕU ψ) iff ∀π ∈ CI (η)(s), ∃u ∈ N, s.t. K, π[u] |=I ψ and ∀v , (0 ≤ v <
u) : K, π[v ] |=I ϕ
K, s |=I Pη(ϕU ψ) iff ∃π ∈ CI (η)(s), ∃u ∈ N, s.t. K, π[u] |=I ψ and ∀v , (0 ≤ v <
u) : K, π[v ] |=I ϕ
The remaining classical logic connectives (“∧”, “→”, “↔”) are assumed to be
defined as abbreviations in terms of ¬,∨, in the conventional manner. We write
K |=I ϕ if K, s0 |=I ϕ for all s0 ∈ S 0, K |= ϕ if K |=I ϕ for all I , and |= ϕ if
K |= ϕ for all K. The remaining ctl temporal operators are defined:
Oη♦ϕ ≡ Oη(⊤U ϕ) Pη♦ϕ ≡ Pη(⊤U ϕ)
Oη ϕ ≡ ¬Pη♦¬ϕ Pη ϕ ≡ ¬Oη♦¬ϕ
Recalling that η∅ denotes the empty normative system, we obtain the conven-
tional path quantifiers of ctl as follows: Aα ≡ Oη∅α, Eα ≡ Pη∅α.
Properties and Axiomatisation: The following Proposition makes precise the
expected property that a less liberal system has more obligations (and less per-
missions) than a more liberal system.
Proposition 1. Let K be a Kripke structure, I be an interpretation over K,
and η1, η2 ∈ Ση: If I (η1) ⊆ I (η2) then K |=I Oη1ϕ → Oη2ϕ and K |=I Pη2ϕ →
Pη1ϕ.
We now present a sound and complete axiomatisation for ntl and some of
its variants. First, let ntl− be ntl without the empty normative system η∅.
Formally, ntl− is defined exactly as ntl, except for the requirement that Ση
contains the η∅ symbol and the corresponding restriction on interpretations. An
axiom system for ntl−, denoted ⊢−, is defined by axioms and rules (Ax1)–(R2)
in Figure 1. ntl− can be seen as a multi-dimensional variant of ctl, where
there are several indexed versions of each path quantifier.
Going on to ntl, we add axioms (Obl) and (Perm) (Figure 1); the corre-
sponding inference system is denoted ⊢. We then, have the following chain of
implications in ntl (the second element in the chain is a variant of the deontic
axiom discussed below). If something is naturally, or physically inevitable, then
it is obligatory in any normative system; if something is an obligation within a
given normative system η, then it is permissible in η; and if something is per-
missible in a given normative system, then it is naturally (physically) possible:
⊢ (Aϕ→ Oηϕ) ⊢ (Oηϕ→ Pηϕ) ⊢ (Pηϕ→ Eϕ)
Finally, let ntl+ be the extension of ntl obtained by extending the logical
language with propositions on the form η ≡ η′ and η ⊏ η′ (⊑ can then be
defined), interpreted in the obvious way (e.g., K, s |=I η ⊏ η′ iff I (η) ⊂ I (η′)).
An axiom system for ntl+, denoted ⊢+, is obtained from ⊢− by adding the
schemes (Obl+) and (Perm+) (Figure 1).
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(Ax1) All validities of propositional logic
(Ax2) Pη♦ϕ↔ Pη(⊤U ϕ)
(Ax2b) Oη ϕ↔ ¬Pη♦¬ϕ
(Ax3) Oη♦ϕ↔ Oη(⊤U ϕ)
(Ax3b) Pη ϕ↔ ¬Oη♦¬ϕ
(Ax4) Pη f(ϕ ∨ ψ)↔ (Pη fϕ ∨ Pη fψ)
(Ax5) Oη fϕ↔ ¬Pη f¬ϕ
(Ax6) Pη(ϕU ψ)↔ (ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧ Pη fPη(ϕU ψ)))
(Ax7) Oη(ϕU ψ)↔ (ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧Oη fOη(ϕU ψ)))
(Ax8) Pη f⊤∧ Oη f⊤
(Ax9) Oη (ϕ→ (¬ψ ∧ Pη fϕ))→ (ϕ→ ¬Oη(γ U ψ))
(Ax9b) Oη (ϕ→ (¬ψ ∧ Pη fϕ))→ (ϕ→ ¬Oη♦ψ)
(Ax10) Oη (ϕ→ (¬ψ ∧ (γ → Oη fϕ)))→ (ϕ→ ¬Pη(γ U ψ))
(Ax10b) Oη (ϕ→ (¬ψ ∧Oη fϕ))→ (ϕ→ ¬Pη♦ψ)
(Ax11) Oη (ϕ→ ψ)→ (Pη fϕ→ Pη fψ)
(R1) If ⊢ ϕ then ⊢ Oη ϕ (generalization)
(R2) If ⊢ ϕ and ⊢ ϕ→ ψ then ⊢ ψ (modus ponens)
(Obl) Oη∅α→ Oηα
(Perm) Pηα→ Pη∅α
(Obl+) η ⊑ η′ → (Oηα→ Oη′α)
(Perm+) η ⊑ η′ → (Pη′α→ Pηα)
Fig. 1. The three systems ntl− ((Ax1)–(R2), derived from an axiomatisation
of ctl); ntl ((Ax1)–(R2),(Obl),(Perm)); ntl+ ((Ax1)–(R2),(Obl+),(Perm+)).
α stands for a temporal formula.
Theorem 1 (Soundness and Completeness). The inference mechanism ⊢−
is sound and complete with respect to validity of ntl− formulas, i.e., for every
formula ϕ in the language of ntl−, we have |= ϕ iff ⊢− ϕ. The same holds for
⊢ with respect to formulas from ntl and ⊢+ with respect to ntl+.
Proof. All three cases are proven by adjusting the technique presented in [Emerson, 1990].
For the ntl− case, the tableau-based construction of [Emerson, 1990] immedi-
ately carries through: we will encounter, for every generated state, successors
of different dimensions. For the case of ntl, which includes the symbol η∅, we
have to add clauses corresponding to (Obl) and (Perm) to the construction of
the closure cl(ϕ) of a formula ϕ: if Oη∅α (respectively, Pηα) is in cl(ϕ) then
also Oηα (respectively, Pη∅α) should be in cl(ϕ). In the case of ntl
+, we have
to close off cl(ϕ) under the implications of axioms (Obl+) and (Perm+).
Going beyond ntl+, we can impose further structure on Ση and its interpre-
tations. For example, we can add unions and intersections of normative systems
by requiring Ση to include symbols η ⊔ η′, η ⊓ η′ whenever it includes η and
η′, and require interpretations to interpret ⊔ as set union and ⊓ as set inter-
section. As discussed above, we must then further restrict interpretations such
that R \ (I (η1) ∪ I (η2)) always is total. This would give us a kind of calculus of
normative systems. Let K be a Kripke structure and I be an interpretation with
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the mentioned properties:
K |=I Pη⊔η′ϕ→ Pηϕ K |=I Pηϕ→ Pη⊓η′ϕ
K |=I Oηϕ→ Oη⊔η′ϕ K |=I Oη⊓η′ϕ→ Oηϕ
(all of which follow from Proposition 1). Having such a calculus allows one to
reason about the composition of normative systems.
Relationship with Deontic Logic: The two main differences between the language
of ntl and the language of conventional deontic logic (henceforth “deontic logic”)
are, first, contextual deontic operators allowing a formula to refer to several dif-
ferent normative systems, and, second, temporal operators. All deontic expres-
sions in ntl refer to time: Pη gϕ (“it is permissible in the context of η that ϕ is
true at the next time point”); Oη ϕ (“it is obligatory in the context of η that
ϕ always will be true”); etc. Deontic logic contains no notion of time. In order
to compare our temporal deontic statements with those of deontic logic we must
take the temporal dimension to be implicit in the latter. Two of the perhaps
most natural ways of doing that is to take “obligatory” (Oϕ) to mean “always
obligatory” (Oη ϕ), or “obligatory at the next point in time” (Oη gϕ), respec-
tively, and similarly for permission. In either case, all the principles of Standard
Deontic Logic (sdl) hold also for ndl, viz., O(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Oϕ→ Oψ) (K ); ¬O⊥
(D); and from ϕ infer Oϕ (N ). The two mentioned temporal interpretations of
the (crucial) deontic axiom D are (both ntl validities):
¬Oη ⊥ and ¬Oη g⊥
With these translations, all of the most commonly discussed so-called para-
doxes of deontic logic also holds in ntl. However, it has been argued (cf.,
e.g., [Meyer and Wieringa, 1993]) that one of the causes behind some of the
instances of the paradoxes (particularly those involving contrary-to-duty obliga-
tions) is that the language of conventional deontic logic is too weak, and that
by incorporating temporal operators some instances of the paradoxes can be
avoided.
3 Symbolic Representations
In practice, explicit state representations of Kripke structures are rarely if ever
used when reasoning about systems, because of the state explosion problem:
given a system with n Boolean variables, the system will typically have 2n
states. Instead, practical reasoning tools provide succinct, symbolic represen-
tation languages for defining Kripke structures. We present such a language for
defining models, and also introduce an associated symbolic language for defining
normative systems.
A Symbolic Language for Models: We present the simple reactive modules
language (srml), a “stripped down” version of Alur and Henzinger’s reactive
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modules language (rml) [Alur and Henzinger, 1999], which was introduced
in [Hoek et al., 2006]. srml represents the core of rml, with some “syntactic
sugar” removed to simplify the presentation and semantics. The basic idea is to
present a Kripke structure K by means of a number of symbolically represented
agents, where the choices available to every agent are defined by a number of
rules, defining which actions are available to the agent in every state; a transition
(s , s ′) in K corresponds to a tuple of actions, one for each agent in the system.
Here is an example of an agent definition in srml (agents are referred to as
“modules” in (s)rml):
module toggle controls x
init
ℓ1 : ⊤ ; x
′ := ⊤
ℓ2 : ⊤ ; x
′ := ⊥
update
ℓ3 : x ; x
′ := ⊥
ℓ4 : (¬x) ; x
′ := ⊤
This module, named toggle, controls a single Boolean variable, x . The choices
available to the agent are defined by the init and update rules2. The init
rules define the choices available to the agent with respect to the initialisation
of its variables, while the update rules define the agent’s choices subsequently.
In this example, there are two init rules and two update rules. The init rules
define two choices for the initialisation of variable x : assign it the value ⊤ or
the value ⊥. Both of these rules can fire initially, as their conditions (⊤) are
always satisfied; in fact, only one of the available rules will ever actually fire,
corresponding to the “choice made” by the agent on that decision round. The
effect of firing a rule is to execute the assignment statements on the r.h.s. of
the rule, which modify the agent’s controlled variables. (The “prime” notation
for variables, e.g., x ′, means “the value of x afterwards”.) Rules are identified
by labels (ℓi); these labels do not form part of the original rml language, and
in fact play no part in the semantics of srml – they are used to identify rules
in normative systems, as we shall see below. We assume a distinguished label
“[]” for rules, which is used to identify rules that should never be made illegal
by any normative system. With respect to update rules, the first rule says that
if x has the value ⊤, then the corresponding action is to assign it the value ⊥,
while the second rule says that if x has the value ⊥, then it can subsequently be
assigned the value ⊤. In sum, the module non-deterministically chooses a value
for x initially, and then on subsequent rounds toggles this value. In this example,
the init rules are non-deterministic, while the update rules are deterministic.
An srml system, ρ, is a set of such modules, where the controlled variables of
modules are mutually disjoint.
The Kripke structure Kρ = 〈Sρ,S 0ρ ,Rρ,Vρ〉 corresponding to srml system
ρ is given as follows: the state set Sρ and valuation function Vρ corresponds to
states (valuations of variables) that could be reached by ρ, with initial states S 0ρ
being states that could be generated by init rules; the transition relation Rρ
2 To be more precise, the rules are guarded commands.
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is defined by (s , s ′) ∈ Rρ iff there exists a tuple of update rules, one for each
module in the system, such that each rule is enabled in s and s ′ is obtained from
executing this collection of rules on s .
A Symbolic Language for Normative Systems: We now introduce the srml Norm
Language (snl) for representing normative systems, which corresponds to the
srml language for models. The general form of an snl normative system defi-
nition is:
normative-system id
χ1 disables ℓ11 , . . . , ℓ1k
· · ·
χm disables ℓm1 , . . . , ℓmk
Here, id ∈ Ση is the name of the normative system; these names will be used
to refer to normative systems in formulae of ntl. The body of the normative
system is defined by a set of constraint rules. A constraint rule
χ disables ℓ1, . . . , ℓk
consists of a condition part χ, which is a propositional logic formula over the
variables of the system, and a set of rule labels {ℓ1, . . . , ℓk} (we require [] 6∈
{ℓ1, . . . , ℓk}). If χi is satisfied in a particular state, then any srml rule with a
label that appears on the r.h.s. of the constraint rule will be illegal in that state,
according to this normative system. An snl interpretation is then simply a set
of snl normative systems, each with a distinct name.
Given snl normative systems η1 and η2, for some srml system ρ, we say: η1
is at least as liberal as η2 in system ρ if for every state s ∈ Sρ, every rule that is
legal according to η2 is legal according to η1; and they are equivalent if for every
state s ∈ Sρ, the set of rules legal according to η1 and η2 are the same.
Theorem 2. The problem of testing whether snl normative system η1 is at least
as liberal as snl normative system η2 is pspace-complete, as is the problem of
testing equivalence of such systems.
Proof. We do the proof for checking equivalence; the liberality case is similar. For
membership of pspace, consider the complement problem: guess a state s , check
that s ∈ Sρ, (reachability of states in rml is in pspace [Alur and Henzinger, ])
and check that there is some rule legal in s according to η2 is not legal in s
according to η1, or vice versa. Hence the complement problem is in npspace,
and so the problem is in pspace. For pspace-hardness, we reduce the problem
of propositional invariant checking over (s)rml modules [Alur and Henzinger, ].
Given an srml system ρ and propositional formula ϕ, define normative systems
η1 and η2 as follows (where ℓ does not occur in ρ):
normative-system η1 normative-system η2
¬ϕ disables ℓ ⊥ disables ℓ
According to η2, ℓ is always enabled; thus η1 will be equivalent to η2 iff ϕ holds
across all reachable states of the system.
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4 Model Checking
Model checking is an important computational problem for any modal or tem-
poral logic [Clarke et al., 2000]. We consider two versions of the model checking
problem for ntl, depending on whether the model is presented explicitly or sym-
bolically. For each of these cases, there are two further possibilities, depending
on whether we are given an interpretation I for normative systems named in
formulae or not. If we are given an interpretation for the normative systems
named in the formula, then ntl model checking essentially amounts to a con-
ventional verification problem: showing that, under the given interpretation, the
model and associated normative systems have certain properties. However, the
uninterpreted model checking problem corresponds to the synthesis of norma-
tive systems: we ask whether there exist normative systems that would have the
desired properties.
Explicit State Model Checking: The interpreted explicit state model checking
problem for ntl is as follows.
Given a Kripke structure K = 〈S ,S0,R,V 〉, interpretation I : Ση → N (R)
and formula ϕ of ntl, is it the case that K |=I ϕ?
The ctl model checking problem is p-complete [Schnoebelen, 2003]. The stan-
dard dynamic programming algorithm for ctl model checking may be easily
adapted for interpreted explicit state ntl model checking, and has the same
worst case time complexity. More interesting is the case where we are not given
an interpretation. The uninterpreted explicit state model checking problem for
ntl is as follows.
Given a Kripke structure K = 〈S ,S0,R,V 〉 and formula ϕ of ntl, does there
exist an interpretation I : Ση → N (R) such that K |=I ϕ?
Theorem 3. The uninterpreted explicit state model checking problem for ntl
is np-complete.
Proof. For membership in np, simply guess an interpretation I and verify that
K |=I ϕ. Since interpretations are polynomial in the size of the Kripke structure
and formula, guessing can be done in (nondeterministic) polynomial time, and
checking is the interpreted explicit state model checking problem. Hence the
problem is in np. For np-hardness, we reduce sat. Given sat instance ϕ over
variables x1, . . . , xk , for each variable xi , create two variables t(xi) and f (xi), and
define a Kripke structure with 3k + 1 states, as illustrated in Figure 2; state s0
is the initial state, and state s3k is a final state. Let ϕ
∗ denote the ntl formula
obtained from ϕ by systematically replacing every variable xi with (Pη♦t(xi)).
Define the formula to be model checked as:
ϕ∗ ∧
V
1≤i≤k (Pη♦(t(xi ) ∨ f (xi))) ∧V
1≤i≤k (Pη♦t(xi)→ ¬Pη♦f (xi))(Pη♦f (xi)→ ¬Pη♦t(xi ))
This formula is satisfied in the structure by some interpretation iff ϕ is satisfi-
able.
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s(3k)
...
s0
t(x1)
f(x1)
t(x2)
f(x2)
t(xk)
f(xk)
s1
s2
s3
s4
s5
s6
Fig. 2. Reduction for Theorem 3.
Symbolic Model Checking: As we noted above, explicit state model checking
problems are perhaps of limited interest, since such representations are expo-
nentially large in the number of propositional variables. Thus we now consider
the srml model checking problem for ntl. Again, we have two versions, depend-
ing on whether we are given an interpretation or not.
Theorem 4. The interpreted srml model checking problem for ntl is pspace-
complete.
Proof. pspace-hardness is by a reduction from the problem of propositional
invariant verification for srml [Alur and Henzinger, ]3. Given a propositional
formula ϕ and an (s)rml system ρ, let I = {η∅}, and simply check whether
Kρ |=I Oη∅ ϕ. Membership of pspace is by adapting the ctl symbolic model
checking algorithm of [Cheng, 1995].
Theorem 5. The uninterpreted srml model checking problem for ntl is exptime-
hard.
Proof. By reduction from the problem of determining whether a given player has
a winning strategy in the two-player game peek-G4 [Stockmeyer and Chandra, 1979,
p.158]. An instance of peek-G4 is a quad 〈X1,X2,X3, ϕ〉 where: X1 and X2 are
disjoint, finite sets of Boolean variables – variables X1 are under the control
of agent 1, and X2 are under the control of agent 2; X3 ⊆ (X1 ∪ X2) are the
variables true in the initial state of the game; and ϕ is a propositional formula
over X1 ∪ X2, representing the winning condition. The agents take try to make
ϕ true, by taking it in turns to alter the value of at most one of their variables.
The decision problem is to determine whether agent 2 has a winning strategy
in a given game. The idea of the proof is to define an srml system that such
that the runs of the system correspond to plays of the given game instance, and
then to define an ntl formula to be model checked, which names a normative
system η, such that the transitions legal according to η correspond to a winning
strategy for player 2. The construction of the srml system follows that of the
exptime-completeness proof of atl model checking in [Hoek et al., 2006], with
the difference that player 2’s update rules are given labels (so that they may be
disabled). The formula to model check then defines three properties: (i) if it is
agent 2’s turn, then according to η at most one of its possible moves is legal;
(ii) all of agent 1’s moves are legal according to η (i.e, agent 2 must win against
3 In fact, the result of [Alur and Henzinger, 1999] is stated for rml, but the proof only
makes use of features from srml.
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all of these); and (iii) the legal paths according to η must represent wins for
agent 2.
5 Example: Traffic Norms
Consider a circular road, with two parallel lanes. Vehicles circulate on the two
lanes clockwise. We consider two types of vehicles: cars, and ambulances. The
road is discretised in a finite number of positions, each one represented as an in-
stance of a proposition at(lane-number , lane-position, vehicle-id). Thus at(2, 5, car23)
means agent car23 is on lane 2 at position 5 (lane 1 is the outer lane, lane 2
is the inner lane). We also refer to lane 1 as the left lane and to lane 2 as the
right lane. At each time step, cars can either remain still or change their position
by one unit, moving either straight or changing lane. Ambulances can remain
still or change their position by one or two units, either straight or changing
lanes at will. We are interested in normative systems that prevent crashes, and
that permit ambulances take priority over private cars. So consider the following
normative systems:
– η1: Ambulances have priority over all other vehicles (i.e., cars stop to allow
ambulances overtake them);
– η2: Cars cannot use the rightmost (priority) lane;
– η3: Vehicles have “right” priority (i.e., left lane has to give way to any car
running in parallel on the right lane).
We modelled this scenario using an rml-based model checking system for atl [Alur et al., 2002].
Each vehicle is modelled as a module containing the rules that determine their
physically legal movements, and global traffic control is modelled as a set of
norms that constrain the application of certain rules. For example, here is the
(somewhat simplified) definition of a car (we abuse notation to facilitate com-
prehension: for example addition and subtraction here are modulo-n operations,
where n is the number of road positions, and the at(. . .) predicates are imple-
mented as propositions):
module car-23 controls at(l,p,car-23)
init
[] // initialise ...
update
car-23-straight:
at(l,p,car-23) & not(at(l,p+1,car-1)) &
... & not(at(l,p+1,vehicle-n)) ->
at(l,p+1,car-23)’ := T, at(l,p,car-23)’ := F;
car-23-right:
at(1,p,car-23) & not(at(2,p+1,car-1)) &
... & not(at(2,p+1,vehicle-n)) ->
at(2,p+1,car-23)’ := T, at(1,p,car-23)’ := F;
car-23-left:
at(2,p,car-23) & not(at(1,p+1,car-1)) &
12 T. A˚gotnes, W. v. d. Hoek, J. A. Rodr´ıguez-Aguilar, C. Sierra, M.
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... & not(at(1,p+1,vehicle-n)) ->
at(1,p+1,car-23)’ := T, at(2,p,car-23)’ := F;
car-23-still:
T -> skip;
We can then define the norms described above using snl; (again, we abuse
notation somewhat in the interests of brevity; variables must be expanded out
for each car and position, in the obvious way):
normative-system N1
at(1,p,car-i) and at(1,p-1,amb-j) disables
car-i-straight, car-i-left, car-i-right;
normative-system N2
at(2,p,car-i) disables
car-i-straight, car-i-still;
at(1,p,car-i) disables car-i-right;
normative-system N3
at(1,p,car-i) and at(2,p,car-j) disables
car-i-straight, car-i-right;
Using a model checker, we can then evaluate properties of the system; e.g.,
if there is only one ambulance then we have Oη1∪η2∪η3 ¬crash.
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